From Risk Society to Audit Society - Michael Power
(1) Earlier versions of this paper were presented
at the Department of Sociology at Lancaster University and at the
Hart workshop on 'Law and Risk' at the Institute for Advanced Legal
Studies, University of London. Parts of the paper were also presented
at the Universities of Bielefeld and Witten/Herdecke in 1996. The
author is grateful for the helpful comments of Dirk Baecker, Rudolf
Stichweh and an anonymous reviewer.
(2) Porter (1992) has suggested that this is
also the case for accounting. It supplies a distinctive kind of
administrative objectivity which, though arbitrary in itself, embodies
a certain procedural fairness.
(3) Gunningham and Prest (1993), who draw on
the work of Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), suggest that regulators
must signal their willingness to escalate regulation. The mutual
regulation of auditing as a form of control of control must be abandoned
in particular circumstances for stricter forms of policing.
(4) See Lucy Kellaway, 'Why tie yourself in knots
over badges?' Financial Times September 6 1996.
(5) See 'On trial for dangerous dealing' Financial
Times March 21, 1994; 'Alarming instruments of financial change'
Financial Times December 7, 1994; 'Taming the wild beast
of derivatives' Financial Times December 16, 1994.
(6) See 'Derivatives users lack refined controls
of risk' Financial Times December 6, 1994
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